ECE 457A TUTORIAL 09: GAME THEORY

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Dynamic Games (Entry Deterrence)

Incumbent @ players -> Two firms Collude Fight The order of play Enter / 40,50 / -10,0 Entrant

Entrant

Liiis The Entrant decides

whether to enter or stay out Stay out 0,300 0,300 If the Entrant enters, the Incumbent can collude or fight by cutting the price drastically

@ Payoffs ______ Market profits are 300 at the monopoly price and of at the fighting price -> (40,50) -> the Incumbent's

(0, 300)

NE: (Stay out, Fight)

payoffs: (E, I)

Infinitely Repeated Games

Strategies

1) Grim (Trigger)

*Start with "c"

* continue to choose "c" unless other player chooses "B" (or "A"); then, choose "B" (or "A")

		P2		
	A	β	C	7
A	3,5	0,0	12,0	
в	0,0	2,2	0,0	
C	0,12	0,0	10,10	
				_

* At every time slot, the players act simultaneously

(2) Tit-for-Tat * Start with "c" * then repeatedly play the last strategy played by the opponent (3) Play "c" in old moves and "A" in even moves $P1 \rightarrow D \qquad P2 \rightarrow 2 \qquad P1 \rightarrow D \qquad P2 \rightarrow 3$

Minimax Theorem

$$\int_{-\frac{\pi}{2}}^{\frac{\pi}{2}} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{$$

 $\frac{2}{\pi} \max \min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} f(x,y) = -3x^2 + y^2 - 4xy$

(i)
$$\frac{2f}{e^{n}} = 0 = 0 - 6n - 4y = 0 = 0$$

$$f(y) = 3(\frac{-2}{3}y)^{2} + y^{2} - 4(\frac{-2}{3}y)y - 5y^{2}$$

$$\frac{2f(y)}{e^{y}} = 10y = 0 = 0$$

$$y = 0 = 0$$

$$y = 0$$

Stratesyn: maximum st

strategy J: minimum st

2
$$\frac{ef}{ey} = 2y - 4m = 0 \implies y = 2\pi$$

 $f(m) = -3x^2 + (2m)^2 - 4m(2m) = -7\pi^2$
 $\frac{of(m)}{on} = -14m = 0 \implies m = 0 \implies y = 0$
 $y^* = 0$

min mast
$$f(u,y) = man min f(u,y)$$

y

n